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EASING OF IRAN TENSION FACILITATES CONSTRUCTIVE WORK BY UNO

THE second session of the United Nations Security Council opened in New York City on March 25 under more favorable conditions than could have been anticipated at any time within the last month. Notice that Russian troops are to leave Iran in five or six weeks if nothing unforeseen occurs came from Moscow just the day before the delegates assembled. Prime Minister Stalin had reiterated his support of the UNO on March 22, and on the following day the Iranian Premier, Ahmad Ghavam, expressed his belief that a satisfactory settlement of the Russo-Iranian dispute was possible. Thus the chief issue before the eleven Council members lost much of the earlier menacing quality that tended to make it a test case of Russia's intentions in the Middle East. But UNO's effectiveness as a mechanism through which Big Three aims may be reconciled still remains to be tested.

CONFLICT OVER PROCEDURE. The Council's procedural problems, which were first on its agenda, would have arisen in any serious dispute that might have been submitted to it. But Russia's proposal to extend the veto power hereafter over discussions as well as decisions on controversial issues would alter the provisions of the San Francisco Charter of the UNO, making it necessary for the great powers to agree even on what topics or disputes are to be heard in the Security Council. The members of the Council can hardly abstain now from a thorough examination of the Iranian problem. Yet if the Council is to become an effective agency of international consultation and action, the Big Three must also, during the present session, agree on procedures that will make it possible for them to discuss controversial issues without creating on every occasion the necessity for a showdown fraught with danger of war.

Iran's appeal for the removal of Russian forces from its northern province of Azerbaijan was first discussed at the mid-February meeting of the Security Council in London. Russia and Iran were then requested to seek a solution through direct negotiations. But this approach failed, according to Teheran, and the Iranian government notified the UNO's Secretary General on March 19 that it wished the Council to reconsider the matter. The USSR, declaring that negotiations with Iran had not been completed, requested the Council to delay its meeting until April 10. In London, Soviet Foreign Vice Commissar Vishinsky had contended that under the UNO Charter the Iranian issue was a "situation" and not a "dispute," and hence direct negotiations only were in order. The Security Council, however, has proceeded as though a "dispute" were under consideration, thus preventing Russia's use of its veto power to prohibit hearings or discussions—a procedure favored by the small nations which want to have an opportunity to plead before the UNO any complaints they may have against the great powers.

DISPUTE OVER TROOPS. Beyond the dispute over procedures in the Iran case are differences about the status of Iran's sovereignty and the presence of foreign troops on its soil. Iran, which has had the backing of both Britain and the United States in bringing its claim before the Security Council, has based its case not only on its rights under the UNO Charter but also on other documents. By the terms of the Anglo-Russian-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942, which formalized the joint entrance of British and Soviet forces into Iran in August 1941, foreign troops were to be withdrawn six months after the end of the war. The United States joined that pledge in the Teheran Declaration of December 1, 1943 which affirmed Iranian sovereignty, as had the earlier

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Anglo-Russian pact. March 2, 1946 was determined as the date of withdrawal through an exchange of letters between Foreign Secretaries Bevin and Molotov last September. American military units left Iran at the beginning of 1946 and British units by March 2.

Russian forces, however, have remained, chiefly in the Azerbaijan province of northern Iran, where a revolt begun last November led to the creation of an autonomous republic in defiance of the central government at Teheran. This revolt received support from Moscow, and Iran has charged that Soviet forces prevented government troops from quelling the Azerbaijan outbreak at its outset. Recent troop movements within the Russian zone of Iran raised fears both in Teheran and the Western capitals that Russia's aims went beyond protection of the Communist-led régime which had emerged in Azerbaijan. Equally disturbing was the fact that Kurdish tribesmen in Iran, first reported in revolt on March 20, were said to have set up an independent state south of Azerbaijan. The Kurds inhabit the territory lying at the juncture of Iran, Turkey and the Mosul oil fields of Iraq. Taken in conjunction with earlier Russian territorial claims regarding the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, the Kurdish revolt led to further Iranian and Turkish uneasiness, and to Anglo-American concern about possible Russian demands for radical alteration of the régime at the Dardanelles.

BASIC ISSUE OF OIL. Russia, too, could invoke treaty rights to justify the maintenance of its troops in Iran. On March 21, *Izvestia* referred to the 1921 treaty with Iran and pointed out that under its terms Russian forces may move across the border into Iranian territory if there is danger that the latter might become a base of hostilities against the USSR—although not indicating the nature of any present danger. In addition, the 1921 Russo-Iranian treaty also dealt with the basic issue of oil rights in Iran. While the treaty abrogated the former Tsarist oil

concessions there, it prevented Iran from granting them to any other country. During the last two years of World War II, the USSR, as well as American and British companies, tried to gain petroleum and other mineral concessions in Iran, but successive governments at Teheran resisted this pressure. At present the only operating concession to exploit Iran's oil is held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Whether Russia's recent agreement with Iran to withdraw its troops also included terms on petroleum rights was not disclosed at the time of its announcement on March 24.

As the Council approaches the tangled Iranian problem—granting that the procedural difficulties are overcome—it must attempt to reconcile Big Three needs for oil and security in the Middle East, and at the same time insure that the Arab peoples themselves share in the wealth of their own countries. If joint action were taken for exploitation of Middle Eastern oil, the valuable resources of the Arab world could provide much of the capital for agricultural developments and industrialization so sorely needed in the Middle East. An international conference to map out this type of joint action could do a great deal to ease world tensions. The Security Council could also delegate to its Military Staff Committee the task of outlining strategy requirements necessary to maintain security at the Dardanelles, the Suez and in the Persian Gulf.

Such measures demand creative vision and determined execution similar to Allied military cooperation in this area during the war and the economic collaboration of the Middle East Supply Center established by Britain and the United States. Unless the Big Three reach military and economic arrangements at the same time that reconstruction of the individual Arab states is begun, the Arabs will tend to play the great powers against each other and they, in turn, will continue their present jockeying for position in a struggle that could develop into another world conflict. GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

FOOD SHORTAGES AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES HARASS UNRRA

ATLANTIC CITY, March 24—The most important statement yet made in the sun-drenched ballroom of the Hotel Traymore, just off Atlantic City's famous boardwalk, where the forty-seven nations belonging to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration are struggling with the problems raised by the current world food shortage, was not—as might have been expected—a message of hope to the famine-stricken peoples of Europe and Asia. Instead, it was a strongly-worded speech, on March 22, by retiring Director-General Herbert H. Lehman, criticizing the administration in Washington for having terminated its war-time food controls so abruptly last autumn that UNRRA is now able to procure from this country only a fraction of

the supplies it had hoped to purchase here.

The United States Department of Agriculture, Mr. Lehman reported, has just informed UNRRA that it can provide only 5,000 tons of wheat flour and 195,000 tons of wheat for shipments in April—amounts so small that, in his opinion, "they can only spell disaster and death." Mr. Lehman's observation that he could, despite these officially-announced shortages, "see here in the United States large quantities of food which could be exported," seemed particularly pertinent in the luxurious setting of the conference. For as this mecca of vacationers begins what is clearly going to be the most profitable season it has had since before Pearl Harbor, the menus of the large hotels reveal no

traces of war-time restrictions, and the general display of comfort and plenty in the shops along the boardwalk appears fabulous and unreal to most of the foreign delegates.

IS IT TOO LATE TO RESTORE RATIONING?

In his plea for more effective food conservation measures in the United States, Mr. Lehman took sharp issue with Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture, and Herbert Hoover, now in Europe conducting a food survey for President Truman, both of whom have indicated their belief that the present food crisis will end in approximately 120 days. Recognizing the force of the argument that some time would be necessary to restore rationing controls, Mr. Lehman nevertheless insisted that the effort to restore control measures would be worthwhile since "the general result might well be to save many lives which otherwise might be lost."

Whether the relatively rosy picture painted by the Department of Agriculture and Mr. Hoover, or the grim outlook depicted by UNRRA is the more correct version of the immediate world food situation, cannot be easily ascertained amid the welter of confusing technical data available on the subject. It would seem, however, that UNRRA, as an agency which has been charged for the past three and one-half years with responsibility for studying international food needs, is in a far better position to judge the acuteness of the present crisis than are American officials whose knowledge of conditions overseas is necessarily based on second-hand information or quickly garnered impressions. There can be little doubt, moreover, that the large majority of the American people would prefer, as Mr. Lehman declares, to adopt strict controls rather than run the risk of failing to act with courage and determination.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS INTRUDE. Despite the oft-repeated desire of Mr. Lehman to keep politics out of UNRRA, several issues have arisen during this conference which reveal how difficult it is to divorce relief tasks from the large political questions of a world that is deeply conscious of its division into potentially rival blocs. When the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Soviet delegations attempted, on March 22, to obtain membership for Albania in UNRRA, the United States and Britain took the lead in thwarting Russia's move. The ostensible issue in the debate was whether or not Albania should still be considered as being at war with a number of the United Nations despite the change which has recently occurred in its régime. The real

question at stake, however, was whether or not the Western powers would recognize the frankly pro-Russian government of Premier Hoxha.

In connection with Russia's offer of 500,000 tons of wheat and barley to France, part of which is now being shipped to French ports, other disturbing political questions have arisen. During this week's debates, delegates of Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have all given broad hints to the Soviet Union that if it has exportable food surpluses, it should pool its resources with those of other food-supplying areas by joining the cereals committee of the Combined Food Board instead of making separate arrangements with individual nations for allegedly political purposes.

The most delicate political problem which has arisen at the conference was posed on March 23 in a tense session on the subject of the treatment of the nearly one million displaced persons, primarily political refugees from Eastern Europe, who still remain in UNRRA and military camps in the three western zones of Germany. In the opinion of the Polish and Yugoslav delegates, UNRRA should cease its operations in behalf of these people, a large number of whom Jan Stanczyk—Poland's Minister of Welfare—asserted, are being "exposed to the systematic propaganda of troublemakers whose aim is to sow the seeds of another war." Minister of State Philip Noel-Baker, representing the United Kingdom, answered this charge by asserting that UNRRA must not restrict the rights of political refugees who are afraid to return to their homelands under present conditions. "We have fought the war for the liberty of the individual," he declared, "and we do not propose to sacrifice it now." Although the continuation of UNRRA's program for displaced persons has not yet been assured, Mr. Lehman's statement that it is "unthinkable" that UNRRA should abandon men and women who have gone through the horrors of war before a United Nations authority for the care of refugees has been established, holds out hope that political considerations alone will not determine the fate of some of the most unfortunate victims of the war.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

A Daughter of Han: The Autobiography of a Chinese Working Woman, by Ida Pruitt. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945. \$2.75


Fascinating story of "Old Mrs. Ning" and the problems of every-day life among the Chinese people. A book of lasting significance because it approaches China in purely human terms, giving the reader background that cannot easily be secured elsewhere.

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Washington News Letter



U.S. SEEKS MILITARY POLICY TO BACK WORLD COMMITMENTS

The strain in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which has now been considerably eased, developed at a time when the United States lacked a clear-cut military policy. The Army and Navy were being rapidly depleted in numbers when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes sent sternly worded notes to Moscow questioning Russia's removal of industrial equipment from Manchuria and protesting the maintenance of Soviet troops in Iran beyond the treaty date of March 2. Although daring diplomacy succeeds best when military force is available to back diplomatic notes, the strength of our armed forces is not commensurate with the strong tenor of our diplomatic dispatches. Both the Administration and Congress, however, are now aware that it is time to link military policy with foreign policy. Even if relations with Russia were entirely harmonious, international obligations we have assumed through our participation in the occupation of Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan and Korea, and our membership in the United Nations Organization, require us to have a military force adequate to meet our needs.

CONGRESS HESITATES OVER MILITARY POLICY. On V-E Day, May 8, 1945, the United States Army had 8,300,000 officers and men. It now consists of 2,500,000, and at the present rate of demobilization its strength will be 1,550,000 on July 1. No committee of the House or Senate has as yet studied the country's military needs with sufficient care. On October 23 President Truman urged Congress in a special message to pass legislation that would provide a year's military training for all boys reaching 18, but neither branch of Congress has acted on it. Voluntary enlistments numbered 185,000 in November 1945, but they have been declining month by month—131,000 in December, 113,000 in January, 93,000 in February, 73,000 (estimated) in March. In an effort to attract more recruits, the War and Navy Departments have asked Congress to increase the pay and allowances of officers and men by 20 per cent, and both services have arranged for investigations of charges of unfair discrimination between officers and men.

Congress showed almost no interest in the problem of military policy before the recent differences over Russia's policy in Iran developed. On January 23 a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee demanded that the Army release by March 10 those men who had been in service two years. On

February 23 Acting Chairman R. Ewing Thomason of the House Military Affairs Committee declared: "We don't want to have to continue selective service any longer than necessary." But on March 21 both the House Military Affairs Committee and the Senate Military Affairs Committee began to hold hearings on a bill for extending the selective service act beyond May 15, when it expires. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, chief of staff, asked the House Committee to extend it indefinitely. Chairman Andrew J. May of the House Committee had proposed an extension of six months, and Chairman Elbert D. Thomas of the Senate Committee an extension of six weeks.

After the Senate Committee had heard Secretary Byrnes testify on March 21, Senator Warren R. Austin, Republican of Vermont, said that the testimony had shown the international situation "was such as to make more clear the necessity for extending the selective service act." Three days earlier leading members of the House Committee had predicted extension because of "the Russian situation," and Chairman May said: "We must retain the vehicle" (of selective service) so that it will be ready if we should get into trouble."

DANGER IN ARMS RACE. To develop military policy simply by extending the wartime draft law under the emotional stress of anxiety about Russian intentions would be a dangerously haphazard way to deal with an important problem. While we need a force adequate to the requirements of our foreign policy, we invite trouble if, by vagueness about our military program, we encourage other states to engage in an arms race with us. The climate of opinion for such a race is being created. Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, on March 18 said that national defense requires a force of "men and weapons at least equal in effectiveness to those of any nation whose purposes we cannot trust." In Russia on March 21 the Communist party journal *Party Construction* said: "We cannot forget that the armies of other countries are not stopping their development." Adjustment of political issues in such a way that nations can regain a sense of world stability is needed before statesmen and legislators will consider military policy with any degree of clarity. Meanwhile, postponement of the atomic bomb tests at Bikini—which many civic and scientific leaders believe should be abandoned altogether—may contribute to relaxation of international tension.

BLAIR BOLLES